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A longitudinal analysis of YouTube’s
promotion of conspiracy videos
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Abstract
Conspiracy theories have flourished on social media, raising concerns that such content is fueling the spread of
disinformation, supporting extremist ideologies, and in some cases, leading to violence. Under increased scrutiny and
pressure from legislators and the public, YouTube announced efforts to change their recommendation algorithms so
that the most egregious conspiracy videos are demoted and demonetized. To verify this claim, we have developed a
classifier for automatically determining if a video is conspiratorial (e.g., the moon landing was faked, the pyramids of
Giza were built by aliens, end of the world prophecies, etc.). We coupled this classifier with an emulation of YouTube’s
watch-next algorithm on more than a thousand popular informational channels to obtain a year-long picture of the videos
actively promoted by YouTube. We also obtained trends of the so-called filter-bubble effect for conspiracy theories.
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Introduction
By allowing for a wide range of opinions to coexist,
social media has allowed for an open exchange of
ideas. There have, however, been concerns that the
recommendation engines which power these services
amplify sensational content because of its tendency to
generate more engagement. The algorithmic promotion of
conspiracy theories by YouTube’s recommendation engine,
in particular, has recently been of growing concern to
academics1–7, legislators8, and the public9–14. In August
2019, the FBI introduced fringe conspiracy theories as a
domestic terrorist threat, due to the increasing number of
violent incidents motivated by such beliefs15.
Some 70% of watched content on YouTube is recom-
mended content16, in which YouTube algorithms promote
videos based on a number of factors including optimizing for
user-engagement or view-time. Because conspiracy theories
generally feature novel and provoking content, they tend to
yield higher that average engagement17. The recommenda-
tion algorithms are thus vulnerable to sparking a reinforcing
feedback loop18 in which more conspiracy theories are
recommended and consumed19.
YouTube has, however, contested this narrative with three
main counter-arguments20: (1) According to YouTube’s
Chief Product Officer Neal Mohan, ”it is not the case that
extreme content drives a higher version of engagement”; (2)
The company claims that view-time is not the only metric
accounted for by the recommendation algorithm; and (3)
Recommendations are made within a spectrum of opinions,
leaving users the option to engage or not with specific
content.
We are skeptical that these counter-arguments are
consistent with what we and others qualitatively have
been seeing play out on YouTube for the past several
years. In particular: (1) according to Facebooks CEO Mark
Zuckerberg, extreme content does drive more engagement on
social media21; (2) Although view-time might not be the only
metric driving the recommendation algorithms, YouTube
has not fully explained what the other factors are, or their
relative contributions. It is unarguable, nevertheless, that
keeping users engaged remains the main driver for YouTubes
advertising revenues22,23; and (3) While recommendations
may span a spectrum, users preferably engage with content
that conforms to their existing world view24.
Nonetheless, in January of 2019 YouTube announced
efforts to reduce ”recommendations of borderline content
and content that could misinform users in harmful ways
– such as videos promoting a phony miracle cure for a
serious illness, claiming the earth is flat, or making blatantly
false claims about historic events like 9/11”25. This effort
complemented a previous initiative to include direct links to
Wikipedia with videos related to conspiratorial topics.26 In
June of 2019, YouTube announced that their efforts led to a
reduction of view-time from these recommendations by over
50%27. In December of 2019, YouTube updated this estimate
to 70%28. Our analysis aims to better understand the nature
and extent of YouTube’s promotion of conspiratorial content.
Materials & Methods
Recommendations
YouTube makes algorithmic recommendations in several
different places. We focus on the watch-next algorithm,
which is the system that recommends a video to be shown
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next when auto-play is enabled. YouTube distinguishes
between two types of recommendations: recommended-for-
you videos are computed based on the user’s previous
viewing history and recommended are not individualized.
Our requests are made with a U.S.-based IP addresses,
without any identifying cookie. There are, therefore, no
recommended-for-you videos.
Our method to emulate the recommendation engine is
a two step process: we start by gathering a list of seed
channels, and then generate recommendations starting from
the videos posted by these channels.
The list of seed channels is obtained with a snowball
method. We start with an initial list of 250 of the most
subscribed English YouTube channels. The last video posted
by each of these seed channels is retrieved and the next
20 watch-next recommendations are extracted. The channels
associated with these recommendations are ranked by
number of occurrences. The channel that has the largest
number of recommendations, and is not part of the initial
seed set, is added to the set of seed channels. This process is
repeated until 12, 000 channels are gathered.
To focus our computational resources on the parts of
YouTube that are relevant to information and disinformation,
we perform a cluster analysis29 on these 12, 000 channels.
We retain a single cluster of 1103 channels which
corresponds to news and information channels (e.g., BBC,
CNN, FOX...). Since the unsupervised clustering is not
perfect, we manually added 43 channels that we considered
to be consistent with the other information channels. This
yielded a final list of 1146 seed channels, then reduced to
1080 by the end of the analysis after some channels were
deleted or stalled.
∗
We then gathered the 20 first recommendations from the
watch-next algorithm starting from the last video uploaded
by each of the seed channels everyday from October 2018
to February 2020. The top 1000 most recommended videos
on a given day were retained and used in our analysis. As
described below, these videos were analyzed to determine
which were predicted to be conspiratorial in nature.
Training Set
We collected a training set of conspiracy videos in
an iterative process. An initial set of 200 videos was
collected from a book referencing top conspiracy theories
on YouTube30, and a set of videos harvested on 4chan
and on the sub-reddits r/conspiracy, r/conspiracyhub,
and r/HealthConspiracy. A comparable set of 200 non-
conspiratorial videos was collected by randomly scraping
YouTube videos. These videos were manually curated to
remove any potentially conspiratorial videos. As we began
our analysis, we augmented these initial videos by adding
any obviously mis-classified videos into the appropriate
conspiratorial or non-conspiratorial training set, yielding
a final set of 542 conspiratorial videos and 568 non-
conspiratorial videos.
We are sensitive to the fact that classifying a video as
conspiratorial is not always clear-cut. We endeavored to
limit our training set to videos whose underlying thesis,
by and large, satisfies the following criteria: (1) Explains
events as secret plots by powerful forces rather than as overt
activities or accidents; (2) Holds a view of the world that goes
against scientific consensus; (3) Is not backed by evidence,
but instead by information that was claimed to be obtained
through privileged access; (4) Is self-filing or unfalsifiable.
Text Classification
A key component of our video classifier is fastText, a
text-based classifier31. This classifier takes a text sample as
input, and predicts the probability that the sample belongs to
a given class (e.g., a conspiratorial video).
The classifier begins by parsing the training data to define
a vocabulary. Input text samples are then represented by a
concatenation of a bag-of-words and bag of n-grams, as
defined by the vocabulary. An embedding matrix projects
this representation into a lower-dimensional space, after
which a linear classifier is used to classify the text into one
of two (or more) classes.
Video Classification
Our video classifier analyzes various text-based components
of a video using individual classifier modules for each. These
modules, described next, are followed by a second layer that
combines their outputs to yield a final conspiracy likelihood.
1. The transcript of the video, also called subtitles,
can be uploaded by the creator or auto-generated by
YouTube, and captures the content of the video. The
transcript is scored by a fastText classifier.
2. The video snippet is the concatenation of the title,
the description, and the tags of the video. The snippet
renders the language used by the content creator to
describe their video. The snippet is also scored by a
fastText classifier.
3. The content of the 200 top comments defined by
YouTube’s relevance metric (without replies). Each
comment is individually scored by a fastText
classifier. The score of a video is the median score of
all its comments.
4. The perceived impact of the comments. We use
Google’s Perspective API32 to score each comment
on the following properties: (1) toxicity; (2) spam; (3)
unsubstantial; (4) threat; (5) incoherent; (6) profanity;
and (7) inflammatory. This set of seven perspective
scores for each comment is converted into a 35-
D feature vector for the whole video by taking the
median value and standard deviation of each property
(14 features) as well as the median value of the pair-
wise products of each property (21 features). A logistic
regression classifier is trained to predict the conspiracy
likelihood of the video from this 35-D feature vector.
The output of these four modules is then fed into a final
logistic regression layer to yield a prediction for the entire
video.
The two layers of the pipeline are trained on distinct
videos with a 100-fold cross validation. Specifically, our
training set of 1095 videos is randomly split into a 60/40
∗ The list of seed channels and the training set are available at
https://github.com/youtube-dataset/conspiracy
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Comments Snippets Transcripts
Positive illuminati, evil, told, research,
deep, hoax, global, control, killed,
believe, autism, satanic, they,
aliens, info
conspiracy, warming, qanon, truth,
hoax, prophecy, illuminati, supernatural,
report, jfk, deception, ufo, evidence,
energy, mystery
information, all, nasa, weather, noth-
ing, footage, see, warming, evidence,
know, climate, vaccines, ancient, look,
aluminum
Negative cute, universe, eat, future, dog,
left, content, game, cool, imagine,
food, better, loved, quality, pay
biggest, policy, big, sea, camera, sermon,
party, round, november, live, hot, process,
model, culture, duty
gonna, really, like, sea, young, side,
him, black, live, early, policy, think,
away, agents, thank
Table 1. Most discriminating words in the training set for positive (conspiratorial) and negative labels, ranked by TFIDF.
split. The 60% is used to train the four modules of the first
layer. The remaining 40% of videos are scored by these four
classification modules. These scores are then standardized
into four feature vectors each with a mean of zero and
unit variance. The zero-mean ensures that missing attributes
have a null contribution (e.g., transcripts can be unavailable),
while the unit variance allows us to compare the relative
importance of each attribute in the model. The final logistic
regression is then trained on the 40% split to predict if a video
is conspiratorial. We repeat this process with 100 different
60/40 splits. By averaging the 100 logistic regression
models, we obtain the final regression coefficients. Their
relative weights are 52% for the comments, 22% for the
snippet, 14% for the caption and 12% for the perspective
score.
Model Accuracy
To test the accuracy of our model, we manually classified
340 videos not used in the training set. These videos were
randomly sampled so that their score distribution is uniform
between 0 and 1. Shown in Fig. 1 is the correlation between
the conspiracy likelihood of the classifier (horizontal axis)
and the percentage of videos rated as conspiratorial by a
human annotator (vertical axis). With small fluctuations, our
predicted conspiracy likelihood accurately predicts the actual
likelihood of a video being conspiratorial, for example, 70%
of videos with a likelihood score of 0.7 will be conspiratorial.
With a threshold at 0.5, the conspiracy classifier has a
precision of 78% and a recall of 86%.
From a more qualitative perspective, Table 1 shows the
words that are most statistically relevant to discriminating
between conspiratorial and non-conspiratorial videos, as
determined by term frequency inverse document frequency
(TFIDF)33. Words that identify conspiracies seem reason-
ably diagnostic: they are either specific to a topic (e.g.,
aliens, deep - for Deep State, autism - for vaccines),
generic to conspiratorial narratives (e.g., deception, control)
as well as, ironically, words that characterize information
(e.g., truth, know, hoax). It is worth noting that despite being
an omnipresent pronoun, the word they is a highly discrim-
inating word for conspiratorial comments. This denotes the
ubiquity of the narrative they against us. Both all and nothing
in the transcript are also strong indicators for conspiracy,
hinting at a lack of nuance. Words that characterize non-
conspiratorial content are more random, reflecting the fact
that the negative training set is mostly not cohesive.
Figure 1. Percentage of videos labeled as conspiratorial by a
human annotator plotted as a function of the estimated
conspiracy likelihood, on a total of 340 out-of-sample videos.
The error bars correspond to Clopper-Pearson 95% confidence
intervals based on Beta distribution.
Results
We analysed more than 8 million recommendations
from YouTube’s watch-next algorithm over 15 months.
Recommendations were collected daily, starting from the
most recent videos posted by a set of 1000+ of the
most popular news and informational channels in the
U.S. The recommended videos were then fed to a binary
classifier trained to detect conspiratorial content based on
the video title, description, tags, transcript, and comments
(see Methods). The classifier returns the likelihood that a
given video is conspiratorial, a score between 0 (minimal
likelihood) and 1 (maximal likelihood).
Longitudinal Trends
Shown in Fig. 2 is our estimate of the percentage
of conspiratorial videos recommended by YouTube on
information channels, between October 2018 and February
2020 (Raw Frequency). Also shown is a weighted version of
this estimate which accounts for the popularity of the source
video (Weighted Frequency).
The Raw Frequency is computed as the product of
the number of times a video was recommended and the
probability that each video is conspiratorial , Fig. 1. Only
videos with a likelihood greater than 0.5 are counted,
providing a conservative estimate (see Methods). The
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Figure 2. Longitudinal trends of conspiratorial recommendations from informational channels on YouTube, in which each data point
corresponds to a rolling seven day average. The raw frequency is an estimate of the percentage of conspiratorial
recommendations obtained by weighting all recommendations classified as conspiratorial by their likelihood. This frequency
represents the propensity of the YouTube algorithm to recommend conspiratorial content. The weighted frequency is an estimate
of the percentage of conspiratorial weighted by the number of views of the source video. The three dashed and dotted lines
correspond to the raw frequency for the top three topics: (1) Alternative Science and History, (2) Prophecies and Online Cults, and
(3) QAnon, Deepstate, and New World Order (see Table 2). The dotted vertical lines represent the three YouTube announcements
related to their efforts to fight conspiratorial content, on January 25th, June 5th and Dec 3rd of 2019.
Topic Top Words % Rec % Vid
Alternative Science and History
moon, aliens, flat, space, ufo, ancient, nasa, sun, alien, built,
pyramids, planet, technology, mars, david, pyramid, water,
history, humans, human, science, evidence, energy, sky, stone
51.7% 28.7%
Prophecies and Online Cults
jesus, christ, lord, church, bible, shall, spirit, holy, amen, father,
pray, satan, heaven, israel, word, brother, son, pastor, temple,
unto, rapture, christians, praise, revelation, faith
19.1% 14.9%
Political Conspiracies and QAnon
trump, president, wwg1wga, dave, america, country, patriots,
bush, deep, mueller, obama, potus, justice, american, law, vote,
clinton, hillary, military, fbi, plan, media, democrats, war, gold
12.6% 25.9%
Table 2. The top three topics identified by an unsupervised topic modelling algorithm. Each topic is listed with its 25 most
discriminant words and the percentage of recommendations (% Rec) and videos (% Vid) that are within this topic among all the
conspiratorial videos we identified.
Weighted Frequency is computed by weighting the Raw
Frequency by the number of views of the source video. This
weighting captures the fact that recommendations made from
more popular videos have more impact on viewership.
Both of these trends indicate that YouTube experienced a
conspiracy boom at the end of 2018. The raw and weighted
frequency of conspiratorial recommendations reached a
maximum of almost 10% and 6%. Fig. 2. Shortly after this,
YouTube announced on January 25, 2019 their forthcoming
effort to recommend less conspiratorial content.
Starting in April 2019, we monitored a consistent decrease
in conspiratorial recommendations until the beginning
of June 2019 when the raw frequency briefly hit a
low point of 3%. Between June and December of
2019, YouTube announced that view-time of conspiratorial
recommendations had decreased by 50% and then 70%27, a
statement mostly consistent with our analysis. The weighted
frequency trend that we observed, however, tempers these
otherwise encouraging reductions. When the popularity
of the source video is accounted for, the proportion of
conspiratorial recommendation has steadily rebounded since
it’s low point in May 2019, and are now only 40% less
common than when the YouTube’s measures where first
announced.
Content
To understand the nature of the conspiracy videos that
we uncovered, we used a topic modelling technique called
non-negative matrix factorization (NMF). This algorithm
approximates a term-document matrix as the product of a
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document-topic matrix multiplied by a topic-terms matrix,
thus discerning the main topics from the latent semantic
structure of the data34.
This analysis led to three major topics: (1) alternative
science and history; (2) prophecies and online cults; and (3)
political conspiracies. Shown in Table 2 are the top 25 words
from the comments section that are the most discriminating
to cluster conspiratorial videos in topics (but not to detect
conspiracies). The first major topic is the redefinition of the
mainstream historical narrative of human civilization and
development. This content uses scientific language, without
the corresponding methodology, often to reach a conclusion
that supports a fringe ideology less well served by facts. For
example, the refuting of evolution, the claim that Africa was
not the birthplace of the human species or arguments that the
pyramids of Giza are evidence of a past high-technology era.
Conspiracies relating to climate are also common, ranging
from claims of governmental climate engineering – including
chemtrails – to the idea that climate change is a hoax, and that
sustainable development is a scam propagated by the ruling
elite. A number of videos address purported NASA secrets,
for instance refuting the U.S. moon landing or claiming that
the U.S. government is secretly in contact with aliens.
The second topic includes explanations of world events as
prophetic, such as claims that the world is coming to an end
or that natural catastrophes and political events are religious
realisations. Many videos from this category intertwine
religious discourse based on scripture interpretations with
conspiratorial claims, such as describing world leaders
as Satan worshipers, sentient-reptiles or incarnations of
the anti-Christ. These videos rally a community around
them, strengthened by an ‘Us vs. Them’ narrative that is
typically hostile to dissenting opinions, in ways similar to
cult recruitment tactics35. We emphasize that most of the
religious content found on YouTube does not fall into this
category.
The third main topic is comprised of political conspiracies,
the most popular of which is QAnon, a conspiracy based on a
series of ciphered revelations made on the 4chan anonymous
message board by a user claiming to have access to classified
U.S. government secrets. These videos are part of a larger set
of conspiratorial narratives targeting governmental figures
and institutions, such as the Pizzagate, allegations that a deep
state cabal and the United Nations are trying to rule a new
world order, or claims the Federal Reserve and the media are
acting against the interests of the United States.
We found relatively few instances of promotion of
conspiratorial videos about the three topics explicitly cited
by YouTube in their public statement: flat-earth, miracle
cures and 9/11 25. Other common conspiratorial themes such
as alternative theories on the JFK assassination or denial
of the Sandy Hook shooting are also rarely promoted. This
seems to suggest that highly publicized topics fall under
closer scrutiny, while other conspiracies are still regularly
recommended.
The three examples listed by YouTube illustrated
conspiracies which could misinform users in harmful ways.
Tribute ought to be paid to YouTube for effectively filtering
out some dangerous themes, such as claims that vaccines
cause autism. Nonetheless, other themes which we showed to
be actively promoted by YouTube were described by the FBI
Figure 3. Proportion of conspiratorial recommendations
conditioned on the conspiracy likelihood of the source video, for
the three time periods between the YouTube announcements.
Higher values on the right-side of the graph indicate a stronger
’filter bubble’.
as very likely to motivate some domestic extremists to commit
criminal, sometime violent activity15. The report explicitly
cites QAnon and Pizzagate conspiracies, depictions of the
New World Order, and the United Nations as an organization
for the elites to establish a global rule. Similarly, conspiracy-
driven online cults have motivated a matricide36. And,
seemingly more innocuous conspiracies can also cause
unrest, such as when 1.5 million people gathered on a
Facebook group pledging to run onto the military facility
Area 51 in a quest to ”see them aliens”, forcing the U.S.
Air Force to threaten them with the use of force37.
Filter Bubble
There is a clear positive correlation between the conspiracy
likelihood of the source video and the conspiracy likelihood
of the recommended video, Fig. 3. Although it is an expected
feature for a recommendation engine to suggest videos
that are similar to the previously watched video, overly
selective algorithmic recommendations can lead to a state of
informational isolation - a phenomenon called filter bubble
(or echo chamber).
Shown in Fig. 3 is a quantification of this filter-bubble
effect in which we see a clear correlation between the
proportion of conspiratorial content that is recommended
after a conspiratorial video is watched. This correlation is
most striking for the time window between October 2018
through January 2019, but has also decreased proportional
to the overall reduction shown in Fig. 2.
Discussion
Limitations
Our data set of recommendations is aimed at emulating the
default behavior of YouTube’s watch-next algorithm using
a set of 1146 channels as the roots of the recommendation
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tree. Although this set constitutes a small subset of YouTube
and is not necessarily a complete representation of the entire
informational landscape, it was obtained through recursive
iterations on the watch-next algorithm, starting from the 250
most followed channels (see Recommendations in Methods).
It should, therefore, be by construction, representative of the
most commonly recommended informational channels.
Our conspiracy classifier was trained on a set of what
we believe to be ”clear-cut” conspiracy-theory videos. We
recognize that there is an inherent subjectivity in labeling
whether a theory is conspiratorial. Many conspiracies, for
example, intertwine objective facts with fabricated and
far-fetched claims. We have, nevertheless, attempted to
categorize a video as conspiratorial based on some objective
guidelines (see Data Set in Methods).
Although some topics are more nuanced than others,
our conspiracy classifier achieves a relatively high accuracy
(F1 = 0.82), largely by leveraging the presence of
discriminating language as well as references to other
conspiratorial topics in the video comments. Nonetheless,
the classifier does make mistakes: For instance, videos that
debunk conspiracy theories are sometimes mis-classified.
We have adjusted for these mistakes by weighting the
detected conspiratorial videos by the expected detection
accuracy, Fig. 1. Since we have accounted for false
positives (incorrectly classifying a video as conspiratorial)
but not for false negatives (failing to detect a video
as conspiratorial), it is likely that our estimates of
conspiratorial content are conservative. Moreover, videos
with comments disabled or ones taken down by the author
or by the platform before we analyse them are also
missing from our analysis, which is more common than
average for conspiratorial videos. Another limitation is that
personalised recommendations, which we don’t account for,
can significantly impact the experience for individual users:
those with a history of watching conspiratorial content
will see higher proportions of recommended conspiracies.
Our analysis does not capture weather personalised
recommendations have changed at the same pace as non-
personalized watch-next recommendations.
Policy Implementation
Our analysis corroborates that YouTube acted upon it’s
policy and significantly reduced the overall volume of
recommended conspiratorial content. The rebound that we
observed after the low-point concomitant with the second
YouTube announcement27 could be caused by (1) Content
creators reverse-engineering the moderation process to work
around it; (2) YouTube trying to automate a manual
moderation process which was in place the previous months;
or (3) YouTube relaxing its criteria because of lower
engagement or user discontentment. Despite this downtrend
over the past year, the overall volume of conspiratorial
content recommended from informational channels remains
relatively high. Additionally, the weighted frequency of
conspiratorial recommendations - which accounts for the
popularity of the source video - has rebounded in the months
following the YouTube announcement.
Given the massively superior data, labelling and computa-
tional resources available to the company, we can affirm that
YouTube is technically capable of detecting conspiratorial
topics with high accuracy. In fact, for certain topics which
seem to fall under particularly close scrutiny, recommended
videos are effectively stripped from disinformation. For
instance, We did not surface any conspiratorial recommen-
dation about the Corona-virus outbreak, despite the presence
of many such videos on the platform. It is encouraging
to see that YouTube is willing to target specific issues
effectively and in a timely fashion. Deciding what to demote,
is therefore a question of policy more than technology.
The reduction of borderline policy is in fact implemented
selectively. Our analysis indicates that the selection is
mostly happening at the channel level, in line with
YouTube’s strategy to focus on ’authoritative sources’28.
On the one hand, some conspiratorial channels have
been completely banned from the default recommendation
system. In fact, the ten channels which had most
conspiratorial recommendations before April 2019 † and
together accounted for more than 20% of all recommended
conspiracies now make up for less than 0.5% recommended
conspiracies.
On the other hand, since the policy update a set of
five channels ‡ account for 25% of all conspiratorial
recommendations, whereas they previously represented
less than 0.5%. Most of these rising channels intertwine
legitimate videos and conspiracies, and seem to be benefiting
from a white-listed status to have increasingly borderline
content be recommended. Many of these large channels can
funnel traffic from mainstream channels, which explains
why the gap between the raw and the weighted frequency
has been narrowing, Fig. 2. Lastly, some conspiratorial
channels have been continuously recommended throughout
our analysis and seem to have escaped notice, including some
that promote particularly insidious disinformation.§
Filter Bubble
It is true that YouTube, overall, no longer recommends
conspiratorial videos with a higher likelihood than what
was previously watched20. This result is in line with recent
research which did not find strong quantitative evidence of a
systematic push towards right-wing political content38. Our
analysis, however, shows that after a conspiratorial video
is clicked, there is a high - yet decreasing - likelihood
that the algorithm will recommend another one. For those
with a history of watching conspiratorial content, the
filter-bubble effect is strongly reinforced by personalized
recommendations, which we don’t capture in this study18.
It is hard to say if this selective exposure is more
pronounced for conspiratorial content than for other
categories. Filter bubbles and its impact in shaping political
opinions might have been overstated39,40, but the fact that
the filter-bubble effect (Fig. 3) has decreased over the past
year in proportions similar to the raw frequency indicates
that it might have been an important driver of conspiratorial
†Anonymous Official, X22Report, Disclosed TruthTV, Edge of Wonder,
Truthstream Media, ZEG TV HIDDEN FROM THE PUBLIC, Matrix
Wisdom, THAT IS IMPOSSIBLE, David Icke, UAMN TV
‡Fox News, Science Channel, London Real, The Nimitz Encounters, After
Skool
§Perry Stone, A Rood Awakening!, Sid Roth’s It’s Supernatural!, Zohar
StarGate Ancient Discoveries, DTBM OnlineVideoTraining
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viewership. Moreover, we argue that the repercussions
of selective exposure may be stronger with conspiracy
theories than they are with more typical political content,
because conspiratorial narratives are rarely challenged or
even addressed on other media. Conspiracy theories also
tend to be unfalsifiable in the sense that evidence against a
conspiracy can often be interpreted as evidence of its truth.
Presenting opposing views, therefore, may not affect the faith
in the conspiracy.
Summary
The overall reduction of conspiratorial recommendations is
an encouraging trend. Nonetheless, this reduction does not
make the problem of radicalization on YouTube obsolete nor
fictional, as some have claimed41. Aggregate data hide very
different realities for individuals, and although radicalization
is a serious issue, it is only relevant for a fraction of the users.
Those with a history of watching conspiratorial content
can certainly still experience YouTube as filter-bubble,
reinforced by personalized recommendations and channel
subscriptions. In general, radicalization is a more complex
problem than what an analysis of default recommendations
can scope, for it involves the unique mindset and viewing
patterns of a user interacting over time with an opaque multi-
layer neural network tasked to pick personalized suggestions
from a dynamic and virtually infinite pool of ideas.
With two billion monthly active users on YouTube, the
design of the recommendation algorithm has more impact
on the flow of information than the editorial boards of
traditional media. The role of this engine is made even more
crucial in the light of (1) The increasing use of YouTube
as a primary source of information, particularly among the
youth42; (2) The nearly monopolistic position of YouTube
on its market; and (3) The ever-growing weaponization
of YouTube to spread disinformation and partisan content
around the world43. And yet, the decisions made by the
recommendation engine are largely unsupervised and opaque
to the public.
This research is an effort to make the behavior of the
algorithm more transparent so that YouTube can be held
accountable for their statements. ¶ We hope it will fuel
a public discussion, not about whether YouTube should
allow for conspiratorial content on the platform, but about
whether such content is appropriate to be part of the baseline
recommendations on the informational YouTube
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